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Corinne Langinier1
Abstract
In a model with two basic innovations that are fundamental to the development of an
application, we investigate whether a patent pool can rectify the lack of incentives for devel-
opers to invest in applications when basic innovators themselves cannot develop follow-up
applications. Furthermore, following Green and Scotchmer (1995), we investigate whether
broad basic patents are necessary in order to provide enough incentives for basic innova-
tors. We show that patent pools are more likely to be formed with patents of very diﬀerent
breadth, or with patents of similarly wide breadth. However, even though patent pools
rectify the problem of developers’ incentives, they may reduce the incentive for doing basic
research.In a model with two basic innovations that are fundamental to the development
of an application, we investigate whether a patent pool can rectify the lack of incentives
for developers to invest in applications when basic innovators themselves cannot develop
follow-up applications. Furthermore, following Green and Scotchmer (1995), we investigate
whether broad basic patents are necessary in order to provide enough incentives for basic
innovators. We show that patent pools are more likely to be formed with patents of very
diﬀerent breadth, or with patents of similarly wide breadth. However, even though patent
pools rectify the problem of developers’ incentives, they may reduce the incentive for doing
basic research.
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21I n t r o d u c t i o n
In the area of biotechnology, follow-up innovations are often built on several basic innovations,
and cannot be developed without them. Inventions such as methods to isolate and locate gene
sequences possess the characteristics of public goods. These basic inventions have no value
by themselves, but they increase the value of subsequent applications. Furthermore, they are
usually created by diﬀerent companies than the subsequent applications.2
Two important incentive problems emerge from sequential innovations. First, basic innova-
tors must be given enough incentive to promote basic innovations. The literature on sequential
innovation has mainly focused on how to protect the ﬁrst generation of innovators against future
innovators. In other words, it is concerned with how to transfer proﬁt from second generation
innovators to the initial innovators in order to promote basic innovation (Scotchmer, 1996; Green
and Scotchmer, 1995; Chang, 1995). In this context, Green and Scotchmer (1995) show that
ﬁrst generation innovators should be given broad protection when second generation innovations
can only be obtained by an outsider.3
Second, follow-up innovations may not be brought about when developers decide not to
pursue research if it is built on several basic innovations (Merges and Nelson, 1994). Indeed,
if basic patents are too broad, follow-up innovators may have to pay too many fees to be able
to develop applications. This is referred to by Heller and Eisenberg (1998) as the “tragedy
of anticommons.” There are too many door keepers, and to build on previous innovations an
innovator needs the permission of too many patentholders (Shapiro, 2001). This second problem
2For instance, a public laboratory or a research department at the university can develop basic innovations
while letting the private sector develops applications.
3In the case of a long sequence of innovation, the optimal scope of patents is provided to stimulate R&D
investment (O’Donoghue, Scotchmer and Thisse, 1998).
3is specially acute in biotechnology. A recent survey of laboratory physicians shows that because
of patents one fourth have abandoned a clinical test that they have developed, and almost one
half report that they have not developed a test for fear that they would be sued.4 One of
the solutions is to license patents in a patent pool that is an agreement between two or more
patentholders to license one or more of their patents to one another or to third parties (Merges,
1999). Patent pools play an important role in biotechnology because of the cumulative and
pyramidal structure of innovation.
In this paper we examine how a patent pool that is considered an ex ante agreement can
rectify the lack of developer incentives to invest in an application when basic innovators cannot
develop follow-up applications. We investigate whether broad basic patents are necessary in
order to provide enough incentive to basic innovators, as is the case in the Green and Scotchmer
(1995) model. Further, we wonder what kind of pool will emerge. In other words, are patents
more likely to be broad or narrow in a patent pool? We consider a model in which there are two
patentholders of basic innovations that are mainly research tools, whose market values are null,
but they permit a third ﬁrm to develop an application. In this setting we show that patent pools
are more likely to be formed either with patents of very diﬀerent breadth or, on the contrary,
with similarly broad patents.
In 2001 several companies (GE Healthcare former Amersham Biosciences, Biolmage A/S
and Invitrogen IP Holdings former Aurora Biosciences Corporation) and Colombia University
agreed to pool several of their patents on green ﬂuorescent protein (GFP). This is a ﬂuorescent
reporter molecule used in drug discovery to create a detailed picture of how potential drugs
4This survey has been conducted by Jon Merz and Mildred Cho, bioethicists at the University of Pennsylvania,
and has been reported by Thompson, Washington Monthly, April 2001.
4aﬀect the function of protein. The patent pool contains several US patents, as well as European
and Japanese patents. “All users of GFP are required to obtain a license to use the technology
prior to starting research work” (GE Healthcare conditions for licensing5). Therefore, one can
consider a patent pool as an ex ante agreement oﬀer to any potential developers. The application
areas include research in cell biology and pharmaceutical screening. A careful examination of
the patents included in the pool shows that they tend to be broad if we use Lerner’s proxy of
the scope as being the four-digit of the international patent classes (IPC). Indeed, according to
Lerner’s analysis (1994), biotechnology patents have, on average, 1.68 number of four-digit IPCs.
Among the eleven patents that are in the pool, if we put together those that are continuations
of others (two patents, each with two continuations), most have more than two four-digit IPCs.
In fact, only one of them has one four-digit IPC. This seems to be consistent with one of our
r e s u l t st h a ts t a t e st h a tp o o l sa r em o r el i k e l yt ob ef o r m e dw i t hb r o a dp a t e n t s( s e eT a b l e1t h a t
summarizes the information about this existing patent pool).
Our analysis is related to the two streams of literature mentioned above: the literature on
sequential innovation and more particularly the paper by Green and Scotchmer (1995), and the
more recent literature on patent pools.
In a model with one patentholder on a basic innovation and one potential innovator to develop
the application, Green and Scotchmer (1995) show that an ex ante agreement should be allowed
in order to insure that investment in the second innovation will be undertaken. When there is
no uncertainty about the value of the follow-up innovation, the best policy consists in giving a
broad patent to the ﬁrst innovator and the ex ante licensing improves social welfare whatever
5See the web site http://www.gehealthcare.com.
5the patent breadth.6 However, if the developers’ costs are private knowledge, patentholders do
not necessarily oﬀer ex ante licensing (Bessen, 2004). We built up on the model of Green and
Scotchmer (1995) to investigate patent pools. We explicitly introduce patent breadth, and we
extend their analysis to two basic patents that can be pooled in an ex ante agreement in a model
where there is common knowledge about costs.
Patent pools are viewed as a possible solution for reducing additional transaction costs
incurred in navigating the patent thicket (Shapiro, 2001) or the anticommon problem (Heller
and Eisenberg, 1998). They can also enhance eﬃciency by eliminating the complement problem
(Shapiro, 2001), and may beneﬁt society (Gilbert, 2004; Lerner and Tirole, 2004). Following
Cournot analysis, Shapiro (2001) shows that a package of licenses for basic innovations neither
harms consumers nor the ﬁrms themselves, as long as the royalty rates are low.
The major beneﬁts of patent pools are that they eliminate staking licensing, reduce licensing
transaction costs, reduce patent litigation and allow for the exchange of information. However,
a patent pool can have anticompetitive eﬀects. Antitrust authorities have been consistently
more suspicious of a pool of substitutable patents than of a pool of complementary patents. If
patents are perfect complements, a pool eliminates the double marginalization (Shapiro, 2001).
If they are perfect substitutes, a pool eliminates competitors. However, patents are rarely perfect
complements or perfect substitutes. In this context, Lerner and Tirole (2004) study a model of
pool formation and pricing and show that a pool can increase or decrease the price, depending
6If there is competition at the level of development, Scotchmer (1996) shows that patents on second generation
products (when they infringe on the ﬁrst innovation) are not necessary to encourage their development, and the
patentholder of the basic innovation collects a larger share of the proﬁt if second generation products are not
patentable. On the other hand, if competition can take place at both research and development stages, and if
both stages can be done by the same ﬁrm, Denicolo (2000) shows that weak forward protection can be preferable.
6on the internal or external competition. An empirical study shows that large pools are more
likely to allow individual licensing, centralize control of litigation and to license to third party
(Lerner, Strojwas and Tirole, 2003). In our model, we consider that a patent pool is an ex
ante agreement where patents are complements as both innovations are needed to develop the
application. In this setting, we wonder what breadths of patents are more likely to be pooled
together.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present a benchmark model, based on the
Green and Scotchmer (1995) model, in which one basic innovator holds a patent. In section 3, we
consider that two basic innovations are owned by two diﬀerent patentholders and we determine
the composition of the patent pool. Section 4 concludes.
2 Benchmark Case: One Basic Innovator
We consider a modiﬁed version of the Green and Scotchmer (1995) model (hereafter GS), in
which only one initial innovator, ﬁrm 1, holds a patent. The associated (sunk) cost for discovering
the basic innovation is c. This protected innovation has no value by itself, but it is necessary to
develop an application. For instance, it could be a gene that may be useful in the development
of a certain medicine.7
A second generation of product (an application that uses the patented innovation) has a
monopoly value v and cost ca of development. If it infringes, the application can only be
introduced on the market if an (ex ante or ex post) agreement has been reached with the
7For instance, a combination of several research tools (the PCR enzyme for replicating DNA, technologies for
inserting foreign genes into germplasms, technologies for making those genes produce proteins,...) has been used
to develop a version of BT corn, i.e., corn seeds that code for and “express” (i.e., produce protein fot) a particular
kind of pest resistance.
7patentholder, and thus, its value is v, to be shared with the initial innovator. If the application
does not infringe upon the patented innovations, the value v is for the developer alone. There
is no uncertainty concerning the future value of the application.8
The scope of protection (i.e., breadth) that the initial innovator obtains for his innovation
can be narrow or broad. In the case of a patent of inﬁnite breadth, the application will always
infringe upon the patented basic innovation. On the contrary, if the breadth of patent is null,
the application does not infringe. Therefore, the breadth of a patent is related to the ex ante
probability of infringing. Based on that observation, we deﬁne the breadth as being exactly the
probability of infringing. Hence, with probability b ∈ [0,1] the application infringes upon the
patent, and with probability (1 − b) it does not.9
A tb e s t ,i ft h eﬁrst innovator of the basic innovation were to develop the application as well,
he would invest in the application if v − ca > 0.
However, the initial innovator may be unable to develop the application if, for instance, he
specializes in fundamental research rather than in development. In this setting, the application
must be developed by another ﬁrm that does not hold the basic innovation. We assume that
the application can be developed by only one ﬁrm, as is the case in GS (1995).
Consider that only one innovator, namely ﬁrm A, can develop the application. Following GS
(1995) we assume that parties will achieve ex post eﬃciency. In other words, in absence of any ex
ante agreement, the developer and the basic innovator must agree on an ex post licensing if the
application infringes on the basic patent. Without such an agreement, the application cannot
be developed. So the patentholder gets −c and the developer −ca if he has decided to invest.
8We consider a very simple model where there is no uncertainty. A more realistic approach, and more compli-
cated, should take into account the fact that the value of the application is uncertain.
9Broad biotechnology patents are more likely to be litigated (Lerner, 1994).
8The developer can also decide not to invest in the application, and thus, the patentholder still
has the same ﬁxed cost to incur and the developer has a null payoﬀ. If the developer invests and
the application infringes upon the patent, both ﬁrms reach an ex post agreement, and therefore,
ﬁrm 1 gets −c + Kv and ﬁrm A gets −ca +( 1− K)v,w h e r eK represents the fraction of the
gain that goes to the ﬁrst innovator. If the infringement always occurs (b =1 ), the developer
invests only if −ca +( 1− K)v>0. The investment in the application will not be undertaken
as often as if the same unique ﬁrm were to do all of the research and development. So here the
developer does not invest enough.
If the application does not infringe upon the basic innovation (b =0 ), the developer can
exploit his innovation without having to pay for the use of the initial patent. The ﬁrst innovator
gets a payoﬀ of −c and the developer enjoys the total beneﬁt from the application −ca + v.
However, ex ante, nobody knows whether the application will infringe or not, and therefore,
in order to decide to invest, the developer must compare his expected payoﬀ from investing,
i.e., b(−ca +( 1− K)v)+( 1− b)(−ca + v)=−ca +( 1− bK)v to 0. He will invest only if
−ca+(1−bK)v>0, which is clearly even worse than when they all know whether the application
infringes or not.
As we are mainly interested in looking at the case where there is a lack of incentive to do
research for the application if there is infringement, we restraint our analysis to certain values
of the parameters. We summarize the assumptions in the following lemma:
Lemma 1 The value of the second generation product v is such that
v − ca − c ≥ 0 (1)
v(1 − K) − ca < 0 (2)
9Kv− c>0 (3)
Equation (1) states that all of the research would have been undertaken by the initial in-
novator, had he been able to do so. In other words, the innovation is worthwhile. The second
assumption (2) implies that if the infringement occurs, no ex post agreement can be reached.
And ﬁnally, the third assumption (3) insures that the basic innovator undertakes the basic
research as long as he can get a suﬃcient market share in the ex post agreement.
In order to solve the under-investment problem, we follow GS (1995) and we assume that
the ﬁrms can sign an ex ante agreement. Before the investment is undertaken by the developer,
both ﬁrms can agree on ex ante licensing. In GS (1995), ﬁrms are engaged in a cooperative
simultaneous bargaining game. Each of them receives his threat point proﬁt plus one-half of the
bargaining surplus. Thus, for each threat-point considered, the ﬁrms will get a certain proﬁt
that must be at least equal to what they will earn without it.
Here we depart from the GS model, and assume that ﬁrst the patentholder decides to oﬀer
an ex ante agreement to the developer, who decides whether or not to accept it (a “take-it-
or-leave-it” oﬀer). The payoﬀ of the patentholder becomes −c + k(v − ca), and the developer,
(1−k)(v−ca),w h e r ek is at the discretion of the patentholder. The ﬁrst-mover advantage that
results from this sequential bargaining will manifestly push the patentholder to make an oﬀer
with k a sl a r g ea sp o s s i b l e( k =1− ε,w i t hε very small).
The possibility of having an ex ante agreement restores the incentive to invest. Indeed, the
investment will take place if (1 − k)(v − ca) > 0. Thus, as long as k>0, the investment will
be undertaken if v − ca > 0,e v e ni f−ca +( 1− bK)v<0. In GS (1995), when the threat-point
proﬁti s−c for the patentholder and 0 for the developer, as is the case when the developer does
n o ti n v e s tw i t h o u ta nex ante agreement, the ex ante agreement payoﬀs become −c+(v−ca)/2
10for the patentholder and (v − ca)/2 for the developer. In their formulation, k =1 /2,a sb o t h
ﬁrms simultaneously agree on a share of proﬁts, and b =1or b =0 .
Without an ex ante agreement, the developer will decide to invest if −ca+(1−bK)v>0.I f
this inequality does not hold, the ex ante agreement will be preferred as long as (1−k)(v−ca) > 0,
and this does not depend on the breadth. However, if the previous inequality holds, the patent
breadth plays a crucial role.
I ft h ep a t e n ti ss on a r r o wt h a tt h e r ei sn oi n f r i n g e m e n t( b =0 ), the developer will accept the
ex ante agreement only if (1−k)(v −ca) >v−ca. This last inequality does not hold, and there
will be no ex ante agreement. Or, in other terms, the developer gains more when his application
does not infringe than when it does. This result is similar to one of GS (1996). From it, they
conclude that in order to reduce the payoﬀ of the developer, the best patent breadth must be
inﬁnite.
For any positive value of the breadth (0 <b≤ 1), if an ex ante agreement can be reached,
the developer will invest whenever an ex ante agreement has been oﬀered, but only for b<
(v − ca)/Kv if the patentholder does not oﬀer such an agreement. Further, the developer will
accept an ex ante agreement as long as b>min[k(v − ca)/Kv,(v − ca)/Kv]. However, in
choosing between an ex ante agreement or ex post eﬃciency, the patentholder never oﬀers an
ex ante agreement as long as b>[k(v − ca)/Kv,(v − ca)/Kv]. Therefore, for b<(v − ca)/Kv,
ex post eﬃciency will be reached, whereas for b>(v − ca)/Kv,a nex ante agreement will be
reached. We summarize this ﬁrst result.
Proposition 1 (Green and Scotchmer (1995)) If there is only one basic innovator, ex ante
agreement restores the incentive to develop an application.
Nevertheless, ex ante, the patentholder needs to have enough incentive to invest in the basic
11innovation. In absence of an ex ante agreement, ﬁrm 1 will undertake basic research only if
b ≥ c/Kv.I np r e s e n c eo fa nex ante agreement, it will undertake basic research if k ≥ c/(v−ca).
We can, thus, posit the following result.
Proposition 2 (basic research) Under the assumptions of lemma 1, ﬁrm 1 invests ex ante in
basic research only if the patent protection is not too narrow (i.e., b ≥ c/Kv) and the market
s h a r eh eg e t si nc a s eo fa ne xa n t ea g r e e m e n ti sl a r g ee n o u g h( i . e . ,k ≥ c/(v − ca)).
Once ﬁrm 1 has enough incentive to invest in basic research, we can summarize whether an
ex ante or ex post agreement will take place at the equilibrium in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 (ex ante versus ex post agreements) Under the assumptions of lemma 1, and if
there is investment in basic research (i.e., b ≥ c/Kv and k ≥ c/(v − ca)),
i. for smaller probabilities of infringement, i.e., b<(v−ca)/Kv, the equilibrium is such that
there is only ex post agreement.
ii. for larger probabilities of infringement, i.e., b ≥ (v − ca)/Kv, the equilibrium is such that
t h e r ei so n l ye xa n t ea g r e e m e n t .
For intermediate values of the patent breadth (b ∈ [c/Kv,(v − ca)/Kv]), the Nash perfect
equilibrium is such that the patentholder does not oﬀer an ex ante agreement, and the developer
invests. If infringement occurs, there is ex post eﬃciency (point i.). For a broad patent protection
(b ∈ [(v − ca)/Kv,1]), the Nash perfect equilibrium is such that the patentholder oﬀers an ex
ante agreement that the developer accepts (point ii.).
If the objective of the government is to minimize the monopoly power of the innovator
without reducing the incentive to do either fundamental or applied research, the best policy
12could be to set b∗ = c/Kv + ε,a sl o n ga sk ≥ c/(v − ca). With such patent protection, at the
equilibrium only ex post agreement will occur.
There is an implicit trade-oﬀ between length and breadth. Indeed, if the value of the appli-
cation v depends on the duration of the patent, and if we assume that the longer the patent, the
higher the value of the application, long patents do not need to be broad. There is a trade-oﬀ
between long and narrow patents, and short and broader patents. Furthermore, as ∂b∗/∂K < 0,
the higher the market share of the proﬁt that goes to the basic innovator, the narrower should
be the patent protection.
If the patent protection is broader (i.e., b ≥ (v − ca)/Kv), the ex ante agreement restores
the incentive to develop the application. However, the patent protection does not need to be
very broad (i.e., b =1 ) to give enough incentive to the basic innovator. If b =( v − ca)/Kv,t h e
higher the K,t h el o w e rt h eb. On the other hand, ∂b/∂v > 0, and thus the higher the value of
the application, the larger the patent breadth.
The sequential bargaining game introduces a decision stage, and the bargaining is no longer
the equilibrium solution. Nevertheless, we ﬁnd, as in the GS (1995)’s model, that ex ante
agreement can restore the decision of the developer to invest, and that the ﬁrst patentholder
cannot capture all of the surplus.
We now consider that two basic patents are held by two innovators.
3 Two Basic Innovators and Patent Pool
Consider now that instead of having one initial innovator, we have two initial innovators, called
ﬁrms 1 and 2, and each of them holds a patent on a basic innovation. They have incurred costs
c1 and c2 to make these discoveries. We continue to assume that each basic innovation has no
13value by itself, but is indispensable tin developing the development. In other words, even if their
value is null, their value-added quality is very important to the applications’ development. The
follow-up innovation (or application) still has a value of v once it has been developed at cost ca
by another ﬁrm. The application cannot exist without the two basic discoveries. As before only
one innovator can develop the application.
If the application does not infringe on the two previous patents, then its value is simply v,
as the developer can freely use both basic innovations without having to pay royalties to their
holders.
We ﬁrst consider the two polar cases where the application does and does not infringe on
the basic innovations. Then we introduce the breadth of the patents.
3.1 Infringement or No Infringement
Without ex ante agreement, the developer has to decide whether to invest or not. If he does
not invest, each patentholder receives −ci,w h e r ei =1 ,2 and the developer has a null payoﬀ.I f
he decides to invest and the application does not infringe on the two basic patents, the payoﬀs
are −ci for each i =1 ,2 and v − ca for the developer. In case of infringement, we assume that
the application infringes on both patents. As we assume that there is ex post eﬃciency, the
developer and both patentholders agree on ex post licensing. This leaves payoﬀso f−ci + Ke
i v
to each patentholder i =1 ,2 and −ca +( 1− Ke
1 − Ke
2)v to the developer, where Ke
i is the
fraction of payoﬀ that goes to each patentholder. In absence of any ex ante agreement, the
developer will not invest if −ca+(1−Ke
1 −Ke
2)v<0 even if −ca+v>0. There is therefore, the
same under-investment problem with two patentholders. However, if ex ante agreements can be
reached, this problem can be solved.
14We assume that both patentholders decide simultaneously whether or not to pool their
patents. If they both agree on a patent pool of their two patents, they can propose an ex
ante agreement to the developer. Then the developer may decide to refuse or accept it. If one
patentholder decides not to pool, we assume that the patentholder does not want to oﬀer any
kind of ex ante agreement to the developer. Then, if one of them agrees to pool and the other
refuses, no pool will be proposed, but the patentholder who wanted to be part of a pool oﬀers
an ex ante agreement to the developer.
It can be the case that both patentholders propose an ex ante agreement (in a patent pool),
none propose it, or eventually just one propose it. If both of them propose an agreement and
the developer accepts it, they will receive −ci +k
p





for the developer.10 If only one of the patentholders proposes an ex ante agreement to the
developer (as he was the only one willing to form a pool), the application can still infringe on
the other patent. If it does ex post licensing is needed to bring about the application. In this
case, the patentholder that refuses the ex ante agreement, let us say j, will bargain over the
totality of the gain from the application, namely v.T h u s ,t h ep a y o ﬀ of j will be −cj + Kjv for
j =1 ,2 and j 6= i. The surplus over which ﬁrm i and the developer will ex ante bargain is thus
(1 − Kj)v − ca. Therefore, the patentholder i gets −ci + ki((1 − Kj)v − ca) and the developer
gets (1 − ki)((1 − Kj)v − ca).
We now consider that each patent has a diﬀerent breadth, and thus, we deﬁne bi as the
breadth for the patent that belongs to ﬁrm i for i =1 ,2.W ed on o td e ﬁne ap r i o r iwhich patent
is broader than the other, and as before, we assume that bi ∈ (0,1) for i =1 ,2.
10A sp a t e n t h o l d e r sd e c i d et op r o p o s eap o o lo fp a t e n t s ,t h e yc a nc h o o s ek




p(v − ca),w h e r ek
p represents the fraction that goes to the pool, and (1 − k
p)(v − ca) to the developer.
15If the application does not infringe (b1 = b2 =0 ), then depending upon with whom the
developer has an ex ante agreement, the payoﬀsa r e−cj for the patentholder that does not
have an ex ante agreement, −ci +ki(v −ca) for the patentholder that proposes such an ex ante
agreement, and (1 − ki)(v − ca) for the developer.
As before, in the case where the application infringes (b1 = b2 =1 ), at best, if both paten-




2)(v−ca).T h u s ,a sl o n g
as this payoﬀ is positive, the application will be brought about. But if only one patentholder
decides to propose an ex ante agreement, the developer will get (1 − ki)((1 − Kj)v − ca),a n d
therefore, the investment will be undertaken only if (1 − Kj)v − ca > 0, i.e., less often than in
the case with only one patentholder of basic innovations.
As the patentholders choose simultaneously whether or not to propose a pool of basic patents
to the developer (and thus, whether to propose an ex ante agreement or not), we can ﬁnd the
Nash equilibria that solve the patent pool game. Because we are mainly interested in knowing
how ﬁrms will behave when the investment is not undertaken in the case of no ex ante agreement,
we summarize the assumptions in the following lemma:
Lemma 2 The value of the second generation product v is such that
v(1 − Ke
1 − Ke
2) − ca < 0 (4)
v(1 − Ki) − ca < 0 (5)
Kiv − ci > 0 (6)
We ﬁrst consider the case in which the application infringes on the two basic patents. If
patentholder i believes that j will choose to propose a pool, j is better oﬀ choosing not be part
of the pool oﬀer, as he will earn −ci + kiv,c o m p a r e dw i t h−ci + k
p
i (v − ca) if he proposes an
16ex ante agreement. If he anticipates that j will not oﬀer an ex ante agreement, i will decide to
oﬀer it as −ci + ki((1 − Kj)v − ca) > −ci.W et h u sﬁnd two symmetric Nash equilibria. These
r e s u l t sh o l da sl o n ga s(1−Kj)v −ca > 0.I f(1−Kj)v −ca < 0, the two patentholders have an
incentive to pool their patents as they both compare −ci + k
p
i (v − ca) to −ci.
Proposition 4 (patent pool and infringement) Under the assumptions of Lemmas 1 and 2, if
the application infringes on both patents and k ≥ ci/(v − ca), there exists a Nash equilibrium in
which the two patentholders decide to pool. The developer accepts the ex ante agreement.
If assumption (5) in Lemma 2 is relaxed, there exists two symmetric Nash equilibria. Either
patentholder i proposes an ex ante agreement and j does not or, conversely, patentholder i
does not proposes an ex ante agreement and j does. The developer accepts the agreement. The
patentholders are better oﬀ if they do not simultaneously propose an ex ante agreement when the
application does infringe on the two basic patents. The reason is simply that neither of them want
to be the ﬁrst to propose an agreement, but they prefer that someone proposes the agreement
over having no agreement. If they were to make their decisions sequentially, there would be a





he can only gain (1 − ki)((1 − Kj)v − ca). Thus, the developer gains less without the pool.
If assumption (4) no longer holds, none of the basic innovators choose an ex ante agreement;
thus, there is ex post eﬃciency.
Nevertheless, if (1 − Kj)v − ca < 0 a patent pool is the better solution, as otherwise the
development will not be undertaken.
We now consider the case in which the application does not infringe upon the two patents
(b1 = b2 =0 ). If there is an ex ante agreement with one of the patentholders, the payoﬀsa r e
−cj for the patentholder who has no ex ante agreement, −ci + ki(v − ca) for the patentholder
17in the ex ante agreement, and (1 − ki)(v − ca) for the developer.
We determine the Nash equilibrium in this setting. If one patentholder believes that the
other will propose an ex ante agreement, he will also choose an ex ante agreement, as he
compares −ci + ki(v − ca) to −ci. If he anticipates that the other patentholder does not have
such agreement, he proposes an ex ante agreement again, as −ci + ki(v − ca) > −ci.T h u s ,a n
ex ante agreement is a dominant strategy in case of non infringement.
Proposition 5 (patent pool and non-infringement) If the application never infringes on either
patent, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium in which the two patentholders decide to pool. The
d e v e l o p e rr e f u s e si t ,a n dt h u s ,e xp o s te ﬃciency is achieved.
When the two patentholders decide to propose an ex ante agreement, the investment will be








2 < 1, the application will be brought
about if v − ca > 0.
3.2 Breadth of Patents
Consider now that the breadth deﬁnes the probability of infringing, and recall that b1 is the
breadth of the patent that belongs to ﬁrm 1 and b2 is the breadth of the patent that belongs to
ﬁrm 2.
Without ex ante agreement, if the developer does not invest, each patentholder receives
−ci,w h e r ei =1 ,2 and the developer has a null payoﬀ.I fh ed e c i d e st oi n v e s t ,h eg e t s−ca +
b1b2(1 − Ke
1 − Ke
2)v +( 1− b1)b2(1 − K2)v + b1(1 − b2)(1 − K1)v +( 1− b1)(1 − b2)v and each
patentholder gets bibjKe
i v +( 1− bj)biKiv − ci for i =1 ,2. Thus, the developer will invest only
if v(1−b1K1 −b2K2 +b1b2∆K)−ca > 0,w h e r e∆K = K1 −Ke
1 +K2 −Ke
2. Therefore, as long
as b2 ≤ f1(b1) ≡ ((v − ca)/v − b1K1)/(K2 − b1∆K).L e tu sd e ﬁne Γ = {(b1,b 2)/b2 ≤ f1(b1)}.
18With ex ante agreement, and if both patentholders propose an agreement and the developer
accepts it, they will receive −ci+k
p




2)(v−ca) for the developer.
If only one of the patentholders proposes an ex ante agreement to the developer, the application
can still infringe on the other patent. If it does infringe, an ex post licensing is needed to bring
about the application. Thus, the patentholder who refuses the ex ante agreement, let us say j,
will bargain over the totality of the gain from the application, namely v. Hence, the payoﬀ of j
will be −cj +bjKjv for j =1 ,2 and j 6= i. The surplus over which ﬁrm i and the developer will
ex ante bargain is thus (1−bjKj)v−ca. Therefore, patentholder i gets −ci+ki((1−bjKj)v−ca)
and the developer gets (1 − ki)((1 − bjKj)v − ca).





2)(v−ca), and thus, as long as this is positive, the application will be brought about.
But if only one patentholder decides to propose an ex ante agreement, the developer will get
(1−ki)((1−bjKj)v−ca), and thus, the investment will be undertaken only if (1−bjKj)v−ca > 0,
i.e., less often than in the case with only one patentholder of basic innovations.
As the patentholders choose simultaneously whether or not to propose a pool of basic patents
to the developer (and therefore, whether to propose an ex ante agreement or not), we can ﬁnd
the Nash equilibria that solve the patent pool game.
We ﬁnd that patentholders form a patent pool when they have patents of very diﬀerent
breadths, or on the contrary, very broad patents. When both basic patents are very broad, the
developer will decide to develop the application only under ex ante agreements. Therefore, the
application will only be brought about if a pool of patents is formed. On the other hand, a
patentholder who has a very narrow patent is tempted to oﬀer an ex ante agreement, while a
patentholder with a very broad patent is tempted to wait for an ex post agreement. However, the
19developer will not accept an ex ante agreement from the holder of the narrow patent. Therefore,










We summarize these ﬁndings in the following proposition.
Proposition 6 (pool of patents) Under the assumptions of lemma 2, a patent pool is formed if:
1. the two patents are very broad;
2. one patent is very broad and the other patent is very narrow.
For all of the other conﬁgurations of breadth, ex ante or ex post agreements can be achieved,
but no pool of patents will be oﬀered. For very small breadth, (b1,b 2) ∈ Γ,e xp o s te ﬃciency
is achieved at the equilibrium. For intermediate values of breadth, one ﬁrm oﬀers an ex ante
agreement and the other ﬁrm does not.
20However, basic innovators do not necessarily have the right incentive to ex ante invest in
basic innovation.
For very narrow patents, when an ex post agreement can be reached ((b1,b 2) ∈ Γ), basic
innovators do not invest for bi ∈ [0,c i/Kiv]. Therefore, within this area, investment will occur
only for bi >c i/Kiv.
For intermediate values of breadth, the basic innovator who proposes pooling does not have
enough incentive to invest. One of the basic innovators lacks the incentive for bi ∈ [(v−ca)/Kjv−
ci/kiKjv,(v−ca)/Kiv]. In other words, if the breadth is too large within the considered interval,
there will be no innovation, as one of the basic innovators lacks the incentive to develop the
innovation that is needed to develop the application.
Therefore, ex ante agreement may not be enough to rectify incentives when two basic inno-
vators must decide whether or not to pool their patents. Indeed, each of them has an incentive
to free ride on the other. One of the basic innovators lets the other form an ex ante agreement
with the developer, and then free rides in the case of infringement. The broader the patent, the
higher the probability of free riding. However, if the patent is too broad, there is no investment.
Proposition 7 (incentives to invest) If there are two basic innovators, ex ante agreement re-
stores incentives to develop an application, but may reduce the ex ante incentive to invest in the
basic innovations.
If we compare this result with the one basic innovator case, because of the free riding problem
created by the possibility of letting the other basic innovator share the development cost, we
have a situation of under-investment. Indeed, for the values of breadth where ﬁrms do not form
a pool, but ex ante and ex post agreements occur, the incentive to develop the application is
restored, but the incentive to do basic research is weakened. As a result, less innovation occurs.
214C o n c l u s i o n
Patents play an important role in many industries (e.g., biotechnology) and the existence of
too many property rights on basic innovations impacts on follow-up applications. In a context
where basic innovations have no value by themselves but are fundamental to development of an
application, we show that basic innovators will tend to pool their patents when they have broad
patents or when their patents are of very diﬀerent breadth (one broad, one narrow). By doing
so, they induce investment in applications that would not occur otherwise.
In this very simple setting, all of the variables are exogenous, and the only decisions are on
whether to invest and whether to pool. We do not consider any strategic choice of breadth,
but we rather investigate all of the possible pools that will emerge depending on the diﬀerent
breadths. We also consider the share of proﬁt as given in the case of agreement.
Our analysis of pools relies on an ex ante agreement, motivated by the example given in the
introduction, and on the fact that prior to doing research, innovators need to obtain a license in
order to be able to develop an application.
The problem with such ex ante agreements is that they bring antitrust concerns. Should
we allow initial patentholders to reach an ex ante agreement even though the application does
not necessarily infringe on the initial patents? There exists evidence that the Department of
Justice allows such ex ante agreement (patent pools) when patents are complements but are not
substitutes or rivals (Shapiro, 2001).
One of our results suggests that the broader the patent protection of both patents, the more
likely a pool of patents will emerge. Thus, one may wonder if the emergence of patent pools
that has been observed during the recent years could be the result of a patent policy that allows
for broad patents. However, we also ﬁnd that patent pools can be composed of one broad and
22one narrow patent as well.
Table 1: patent pool GFP
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